Author: Intern: BOUROUMEAU Gabin, HEIP

Edited by: Natalia LYNNYK, Deputy Director General, Program Director at CVU

Introduction

Following the end of Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine, the restoration of democratic processes—particularly elections—will become a central issue. Kosovo presents one of the few precedents where the international community ensured elections in a context of destroyed institutions and deep conflict. This report analyzes the particularities of organizing post-war elections in Kosovo under the supervision of international structures (UNMIK, OSCE, EU, ENEMO), and outlines practical lessons for future elections in post-war Ukraine.

1. Post-War Electoral Context in Kosovo

After the war ended in 1999, Kosovo was placed under the administration of the United Nations (UNMIK). Local institutions were virtually dismantled, the population had been widely displaced, and ethnic tensions remained extremely high. Under such conditions, holding elections without international involvement would have been impossible.

Key conditions:

• Absence of functioning state institutions.
• High levels of public distrust.
• Partial hostility from minorities (especially Serbs) toward new governance.
• No centralized or reliable voter register.

2. International Electoral Administration Architecture

Main institutions:

• UNMIK – Held executive authority and legal oversight.
• OSCE – Organized the elections, established the CEC, registered voters, and trained election staff.
• KFOR (NATO) – Provided the security component.
• ENEMO, EU, Council of Europe – Carried out independent observation and issued recommendations.

This approach ensured transparency, prevented fraud, and guaranteed minority inclusion. However, it also established a model of “managed democracy,” where critical decisions were made by external actors rather than local institutions.

3. Election Phases and Key Challenges

Year	Election Type	Key Features
2000	Municipal	First vote, fully organized by OSCE
2001	National	Establishment of Provisional Self-Government Institutions
2004	Parliamentary	Partial boycott by the Serbian community
2007–2010	Later election cycles	Increased involvement of local institutions

Challenges:

• Legitimacy among minorities: The Serbian community frequently boycotted elections.
• Fragmentation among international actors: Overlapping functions between UNMIK, OSCE, and the EU.
• Lack of implementation: Many strategic recommendations remained unaddressed.

4. Lessons for Ukraine: Post-War Elections

4.1. Institutional Administration

Kosovo lesson: Full external administration can be effective in extreme conditions, but it risks undermining local ownership.

For Ukraine:

• Elections should be conducted by Ukrainian institutions (e.g., the Central Election Commission) with broad participation of domestic and international observer missions (CVU, OPORA, ENEMO, OSCE, EU).
• Technical assistance from UN, IFES, and NDI is desirable for voter registration, IT systems, and logistics.

4.2. Security and Trust

Kosovo lesson: The presence of a security component (KFOR) was critical. Elections were conducted under military protection.

For Ukraine:

• A comprehensive security plan involving the Armed Forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs will be necessary, possibly complemented by a temporary UN or OSCE mission in de-occupied regions.
• Elections may need to be held in phases: starting in safer regions and later in liberated areas, based on risk assessments.

4.3. Participation of IDPs and Minorities

Kosovo lesson: The international community made targeted efforts to engage the Serbian minority (media, quotas, CEC inclusion).

For Ukraine:

• Legal mechanisms should be created to ensure voting rights for internally displaced persons and military personnel.
• Voting procedures should be adapted for citizens residing abroad.
• Representatives of minorities and IDPs should be included in commissions, the CEC, and media efforts.

4.4. Neutrality and Legitimacy

Kosovo lesson: International presence enhanced global legitimacy but was not always perceived as neutral by the local population.

For Ukraine:

• Involve international partners that are trusted both domestically and internationally (e.g., Canada, Sweden, Germany).
• Clearly communicate that the role of international observers is to support—not control—the election process.

4.5. Implementation of Recommendations

Kosovo lesson: Many recommendations by ENEMO and the EU were never enacted.

For Ukraine:

• Establish a memorandum between the CEC, Parliament, and observer missions to commit to addressing recommendations.
• Introduce parliamentary oversight of the implementation of electoral reforms.

5. Strategic Recommendations

1. Develop a phased election roadmap based on regional security conditions.
2. Involve international observation missions at all stages—from preparation and election day to tabulation and analysis.
3. Rebuild election commission infrastructure in de-occupied regions and provide training and mentorship.
4. Support internally displaced persons and military voters in accessing electoral processes.
5. Create a dedicated communication platform to explain the international role in Ukraine’s elections (in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and CEC).

Conclusion

The case of Kosovo demonstrates that international observation missions can play a critical role in ensuring transparent and stable elections in post-conflict environments. At the same time, excessive external administration without a clear localization strategy can hinder the development of national electoral sovereignty. For Ukraine, the key will be to strike a careful balance: draw on the expertise of international partners to build trust and credibility, while maintaining internal control, accountability, and legitimacy over the democratic process.